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Abstract
In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful infor-
mation theoretical framework—the Mutual Information Paradigm—for information elicitation
mechanisms. Our framework pays every agent a measure of mutual information between her
signal and a peer’s signal. We require that the mutual information measurement has the key
property that any “data processing” on the two random variables will decrease the mutual infor-
mation between them. We identify such information measures that generalize Shannon mutual
information.
Our Mutual Information Paradigm overcomes the two main challenges in information elic-
itation without verification: (1) how to incentivize effort and avoid agents colluding to report
random or identical responses (2) how to motivate agents who believe they are in the minority
to report truthfully.
Aided by the information measures we found, (1) we use the paradigm to design a family of
novel mechanisms where truth-telling is a dominant strategy and any other strategy will decrease
every agent’s expected payment (in the multi-question, detail free, minimal setting where the
number of questions is large); (2) we show the versatility of our framework by providing a unified
theoretical understanding of existing mechanisms—Peer Prediction [Miller 2005], Bayesian Truth
Serum [Prelec 2004], and Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013]—by mapping them into our framework
such that theoretical results of those existing mechanisms can be reconstructed easily.
We also give an impossibility result which illustrates, in a certain sense, the the optimality
of our framework.
1 Introduction
User feedback requests (e.g Ebay’s reputation system and the innumerable survey requests in one’s
email inbox) are increasingly prominent and important. However, the overwhelming number of
requests can lead to low participation rates, which in turn may yield unrepresentative samples. To
encourage participation, a system can reward people for answering requests. But this may cause
perverse incentives: some people may answer a large of number of questions simply for the reward
and without making any attempt to answer accurately. In this case, the reviews the system obtains
may be inaccurate and meaningless. Moreover, people may be motivated to lie when they face a
potential loss of privacy or can benefit in the future by lying now.
It is thus important to develop systems that motivate honesty. If we can verify the information
people provide in the future (e.g prediction markets), we can motivate honesty via this future veri-
fication. However, sometimes we need to elicit information without verification since the objective
truth is hard to access or even does not exist (e.g. a self-report survey for involvement in crime).
In our paper, we focus on the situation where the objective truth is not observable.
Two main challenges in information elicitation without verification area are:
(1) How to incentivize effort and avoid colluding agents who report random or identical responses;
and
(2) How to motivate agents who believe they are in the minority to report truthfully.
The typical solution desiderata to the above challenges are:
(strictly) truthful : truth-telling is a (strict) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
focal : the truth-telling equilibrium is paid more than other equilibria in expectation.
We additionally value mechanisms that are:
detail free : require no knowledge of the prior;
minimal : only require agents to report their information rather than forecasts for other agents’
reports; and
dominantly truthful : truth-telling maximizes the expected payment regardless of the other
agents’ strategies.
Two main settings are considered in the information elicitation without verification literature.
In the single-question setting each agent is asked a single question (e.g. have you ever texted
while driving before?) and is assumed to have a common prior which means agents who receive
the same signal (Y/N) have the same belief for the world. Miller et al. [21] and Prelec [22] are two
seminal works in this setting. Another is the multi-question setting in which each agent is asked
a batch of apriori similar questions (e.g., peer grading, or is there a cat in this picture?). Dasgupta
and Ghosh [7] is the foundational work in this setting. Many work [22, 30, 31, 23, 24, 32, 26, 8]
have successfully designed truthful and detail free mechanisms. The design of focal and detail free
mechanisms seems to be more complicated. However, Prelec [22] is truthful, detail free, and focal ;
and Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] is strictly truthful, detail free, focal, and minimal. While these two
prior works have successfully designed focal and detail free mechanisms, their results are typically
proved by clever algebraic computations and sometimes lack a deeper intuition, and also fail to
extend to important settings.
1.1 Our Contributions
The main contribution of the current paper is to provide a simple yet powerful information theoretic
paradigm—the Mutual Information Paradigm (Section 3)—for designing information elicitation
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mechanisms that are truthful, focal, and, detail-free. Moreover, some of the mechanisms based on
our paradigm are additionally minimal and dominantly truthful. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first dominantly truthful information elicitation mechanism without verification.
High Level Techniques and Insights: Our framework provides a key insight by distilling the
essence of building information elicitation mechanisms to information theory properties. If we
measure “information” correctly, any non-truthful strategy will decrease the amount of “information”
there exists between signals. Therefore, the mechanism should reward every agent according to the
amount of information she provides. That is, the information elicitation mechanism should be
“information-monotone”.
To design “information-monotone” mechanisms, we find two families of “(weakly) information-
montone” information measures—f -mutual information and Bregman mutual information—both of
which generalize the Shannon mutual information.
Information theory is not typically used in the information elicitation literature, a key novelty
of our work is showing how the insights of information theory illuminates the work and challenges
in the information elicitation field.
Applications of Framework: Aided by the Mutual Information Paradigm,
1. In the multi-question setting we exhibit two families of novel mechanisms that are domi-
nantly truthful, detail free, and minimal when the number of questions is large—the f -mutual
information mechanism and the Bregman mutual information mechanism (Section 6.1). More-
over, we show that in the f -mutual information mechanism, when any truthful agent changes
to play a non-truthful strategy, no matter what strategies other agents play, it decreases every
agent’s expected payment. This property implies the mechanism is both dominantly truthful
and focal. We note that dominately truthful is already a stronger equilibrium concept than
Bayesian Nash equilibrium which is typically used in the information elicitation mechanisms
with no verification literature.
We also use a specific f -mutual information mechanism to map Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] into
our framework with an extra assumption they make and easily reconstruct their main results
(Section 6.2) which apply to the binary choice case and do not require a large number of
questions, but also do not have truth-telling as a dominant strategy (only a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium).
2. In the single-question setting, we show that the log scoring rule is an unbiased estimator of
Shannon mutual information (Section 5). Aided by this observation, we map Miller et al. [21]
(Section 7.1) and Prelec [22] (Section 7.2) into our information theoretic framework and allow
the easy reconstruction of the theoretical results of Prelec [22] (Section 7.2.2) which is a very
important work in the information elicitation literature. We believe our framework highlights
important insights of Prelec [22] which can be extended to other settings.
We also extend our framework to the setting where agents need to exert a certain amount of effort
to receive the private information (Section 4) and prove truth-telling is paid strictly better than
any other non-permutation strategy (defined later) in certain settings. Finally, we give impossibility
results (Section 8) which imply that no truthful detail-free mechanism can pay truth-telling strictly
better than the permutation strategy in certain settings. This illustrates, in a certain sense, the
optimality of our framework.
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1.2 Related Work
Since Miller et al. [21] introduced peer prediction, several works follow the peer prediction framework
and design information elicitation mechanisms without verification in different settings. In this
section, we introduce these work by classifying them into the below four categories:
(1) Multi-question, Detail Free, Minimal Setting: Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] consider a setting
where agents are asked to answer multiple a priori similar binary choice questions. They propose a
mechanism Md that pays each agent the correlation between her answer and her peer’s answer, and
show each agent obtains the highest payment if everyone tells the truth. In retrospect, one can see
that our techniques are a recasting and generalization of those of Dasgupta and Ghosh [7]. Kamble
et al. [14] considers both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations and design a mechanism such
that truth-telling pays higher than non-informative equilibria in the presence of a large number of a
priori similar questions. However, they leave the analysis of other non-truthful equilibria as a open
question. Agarwal et al. [1] consider a peer prediction mechanism for heterogeneous users.
(2) Single-question, Detail free, Common Prior, Non-minimal Setting: Prelec [22] proposes
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) and the signal-prediction framework for the setting that agents are
asked to answer only one question and the mechanism does not know the common prior. Prelec
[22] shows when the number of agents is infinite, the case everyone tells the truth is both an
equilibrium and that the total payments agents receive in expectation is at least as high as in any
other equilibria. Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum (PTS) [25] extends BTS to a slightly different
setting involving sensors, but still requires a large number of agents.
The biggest limitation of Prelec [22] is that the number of agents is assumed to be infinite
even to make truth-telling an equilibrium. Witkowski and Parkes [30], Witkowski [31], Radanovic
and Faltings [23, 24], Zhang and Chen [32], Riley [26], Faltings et al. [8] successfully weaken this
assumption. However, all of these works lack the analysis of non-truthful equilibria. In constrast,
the disagreement mechanism designed by Kong and Schoenebeck [17] is truthful and pays truth-
telling strictly better than any other symmetric equilibrium if the number of agents is greater than
6.
(3) Single-question, Known Common Prior, Minimal Setting: Jurca and Faltings [12, 13] use
algorithmic mechanism design to build their own peer prediction style mechanism where truth-
telling is paid strictly better than non-truthful pure strategies but leave the analysis of mixed
strategies as a open question. Frongillo and Witkowski [9] consider the design for robust, truthful
and minimal peer prediction mechanisms with the prior knowledge and lack the analysis of non-
truthful equilibria. Kong et al. [16] modify the peer prediction mechanism such that truth-telling
is paid strictly better than any other non-truthful equilibrium. Additionally, they optimize the
difference between the truth-telling equilibrium and the next best paying informative equilibrium.
However, the mechanism still needs to know the prior and the analysis only works for the case of
binary signals.
(4) Other models: Liu and Chen [19] design peer prediction mechanism in the machine learning
setting. Mandal et al. [20] consider peer prediction mechanism for heterogeneous tasks.
1.3 Independent Work
Like the current paper1, Shnayder et al. [28] also extends Dasgupta and Ghosh [7]’s binary signals
mechanism to multiple signals setting. However, the two works differ both in the specific mechanism
and the technical tools employed.
1Kong and Schoenebeck [15] is the Arxiv version of the current paper without Sections 4, 5.
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Shnayder et al. [28] analyze how many questions are needed (whereas we simply assume infinitely
many questions). Like our paper, they also analyze to what extent truth-telling can pay strictly more
than other equilibria. Additionally, they show their mechanism does not need a large number of
questions when “the signal correlation structure” is known (that is the pair-wise correlation between
the answers of two questions). While the current paper does not state such results, we note that the
techniques employed are sufficiently powerful to immediately extend to this interesting special case
(Appendix A)—when the signal structure is known, it is possible to construct an unbiased estimator
for f -mutual information of the distribution, when the total variation distance is used to define the
f -mutual information. Both papers also show their results generalize Dasgupta and Ghosh [7]’s.
Moreover, when the number of questions is large, f -mutual information mechanism has truth-
telling as a dominant strategy while Shnayder et al. [28] do not.
2 Preliminaries
General Setting We introduce the general setting (n,Σ) of the mechanism design framework
where n is the number of agents and Σ is the set of possible private information. Each agent i
receives a random private information / signal Ψi ∶ Ω ↦ Σ where Ω is the underlying sample space.
She also has a prior for other agents’ private information.
Formally, each agent i believes the agents’ private information is chosen from a joint distribution
Qi before she receives her private information. Thus, from agent i’s perspective, before she receives
any private information, the probability that agent 1 receives Ψ1 = σ1, agent 2 receives Ψ2 = σ2,
..., agent n receives Ψn = σn is Qi(Ψ1 = σ1,Ψ2 = σ2, ...,Ψn = σn). After she receives her private
information based on her prior, agent i will also update her knowledge to a posterior distribution
which is the prior conditioned on her private information. Without assuming a common prior, agents
may have different priors, that is, Qi may not equal Qj. We define ∆Σ as the set of all possible
probability distributions over Σ.
In some situations (e.g. restaurant reviews), agents do not need any effort to receive the private
signals when they answer the questions, while in other situations (e.g. peer reviews), agents need to
invest a certain amount of effort to receive the private signals. In the current section and Section 3,
we assume that agents do not need to invest effort to receive the private signals. Section 4 analyzes
non-zero effort situations.
2.1 Basic Game Theory Concepts
Definition 2.1 (Mechanism). We define a mechanism M for a setting (n,Σ) as a tuple M ∶=
(R,M) where R is a set of all possible reports the mechanism allows, and M ∶ Rn ↦ Rn is a
mapping from all agents’ reports to each agent’s reward.
The mechanism requires agents to submit a report r. For example, r can simply be an agent’s
private information. In this case, R = Σ. We call this kind of mechanism a minimal mechanism.
We define r to be a report profile (r1, r2, ..., rn) where ri is agent i’s report.
Typically, the strategy of each agent should be a mapping from her received knowledge including
her prior and her private signal, to a probability distribution over her report space R. But since all
agents’ priors are fixed during the time when they play the mechanism, without loss of generality,
we omit the prior in the definition of strategy.
Definition 2.2 (Strategy). Given a mechanism M, we define the strategy of each agent in the
mechanism M for setting (n,Σ) as a mapping s from σ (private signal) to a probability distribution
over R.
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We define a strategy profile s as a profile of all agents’ strategies (s1, s2, ..., sn) and we say agents
play s if for all i, agent i plays strategy si.
Note that actually the definition of a strategy profile only depends on the setting and the
definition of all possible reports R. We will need the definition of a mechanism when we define an
equilibrium.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of a strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) such that no agent
wishes to change her strategy since other strategy will decrease her expected payment, given the
strategies of the other agents and the information contained in her prior and her signal.
Definition 2.3 (Agent Welfare). Given a mechanism M, for a strategy profile s, we define the
agent welfare of s as the sum of expected payments to agents when they play s under M.
Transition Probability We define a m×m′ transition matrix M ∈ Rm×m
′
as a matrix such that
for any i, j ∈ [m]× [m′], Mi,j ≥ 0 and ∑jMi,j = 1. We define a permutation transition matrix π as a
m ×m permutation matrix.
Given a random variable X with m possible outcomes, by abusing notation a little bit, a m×m′
transition matrix M defines a transition probability M that transforms X to M(X) such that
X ′ ∶=M(X) is a new random variable that has m′ possible outcomes where Pr[X ′ = j∣X = i] =Mi,j .
If the distribution of X is represented by an m × 1 column vector p, then the distribution over
M(X) is MTp where MT is the transpose of M .
We can use transition matrices to represent agents’ strategies of reporting their private informa-
tion. Given the general setting (n,Σ), for the minimal mechanisms, fixing the priors of the agents,
each agent i’s strategy si can be seen as a transition matrix that transforms her private information
Ψi to her reported information Ψˆi = si(Ψi). We define truth-telling T as the strategy where an
agent truthfully reports her private signal. T corresponds to an identity transition matrix.
We say agent i plays a permutation strategy if si corresponds to a permutation transition matrix.
An example is that an agent relabels / permutes the signals and reports the permuted version (e.g.
she reports “good” when her private signal is “bad” and reports “bad” when her private signal is
“good”). Note that T 2 is a permutation strategy as well. We call the strategy profile where all
agents play a permutation strategy a permutation strategy profile. Note that in a permutation
strategy profile, agents may play different permutation strategies. When a permutation strategy
profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we call such equilibrium a permutation equilibrium.
2.2 Mechanism Design Goals
We hope our mechanisms can be strictly truthful, focal, and even dominantly truthful (see informal
definitions in Section 1 and formal definitions will be introduced later). Here we propose two
additional, stronger equilibrium goals. A mechanism M is strongly focal if the truth-telling strategy
profile maximizes every agent’s expected payment among all strategy profiles, while in the focal
mechanism, truth-telling maximizes the agent welfare—the sum of agents’ expected payment. A
mechanism M is truth-monotone if when any truthful agent changes to play a non-truthful strategy
s, no matter what strategies other agents play, it decreases every agent’s expected payment. Note
that the truth-monotone property is stronger than the strongly focal or focal property and it says
any non-truthful behavior of any agent will hurt everyone. In addition to the above equilibrium
goals, we also hope the mechanism can be minimal and detail free (see definitions in Section 1).
2The above definitions of T and the permutation strategy are sufficient to analyze the framework. When consid-
ering more general settings, we will provide generalized definitions of T and the permutation strategy.
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For the strictness guarantee, it turns out no truthful detail free mechanism can make truth-
telling strategy profile be strictly better than any permutation strategy profile. Therefore, the
best we can hope is making the truth-telling strategy profile be strictly better than any other non-
permutation strategy profile. We give the formal definitions for the equilibrium goals with the
strictness guarantee in the below paragraph.
Mechanism Design Goals
(Strictly) Truthful A mechanism M is (strictly) truthful if for every agent, T (uniquely) maxi-
mizes her expected payment given that everyone else plays T.
(Strictly) Dominantly truthful A mechanism M is dominantly truthful if for every agent, T
maximizes her expected payment no matter what strategies other agents play. A mechanism
M is strictly dominantly truthful if for every agent, if she believes at least one other agent
will tell the truth, playing T pays her strictly higher than playing a non-permutation strategy.
(Strictly) Focal A mechanism M is (strictly) focal if the truth-telling equilibrium maximizes the
agent welfare among all equilibria (and any other non-permutation equilibrium has strictly
less agent welfare).
(Strictly) Strongly focal A mechanism M is (strictly) strongly focal if the truth-telling strategy
profile maximizes every agent’s expected payment among all strategy profiles (and in any
other non-permutation strategy profile, every agent’s expected payment is strictly less).
(Strictly) Truth-monotone A mechanism M is (strictly) truth-monotone if when any truthful
agent changes to play a non-truthful strategy s, no matter what strategies other agents play, it
decreases every agent’s expected payment (and strictly decreases every other truthful agent’s
expected payment if s is a non-permutation strategy).
Section 8 will show that it is impossible to ask the truth-telling strategy profile to be strictly
better than other permutation strategy profiles when the mechanism is detail free. Thus, the strictly
truth-monotone is the optimal property for equilibrium selection when the mechanism is detail free.
2.3 Mechanism Design Tool
f -divergence [2, 6] f -divergence Df ∶ ∆Σ×∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric measure of the difference
between distribution p ∈∆Σ and distribution q ∈∆Σ and is defined to be
Df(p,q) = ∑
σ∈Σ
p(σ)f (q(σ)
p(σ))
where f(⋅) is a convex function and f(1) = 0. Now we introduce the properties of f -divergence:
Fact 2.4 (Non-negativity [6]). For any p,q, Df(p,q) ≥ 0 and Df(p,q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
Fact 2.5 (Joint Convexity [6]). For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, for any p1,p2,q1,q2 ∈∆Σ,
Df(λp1 + (1 − λ)p2, λq1 + (1 − λ)q2) ≤ λDf(p1,q1) + (1 − λ)Df(p2,q2).
Fact 2.6 (Information Monotonicity ([2, 18, 3])). For any strictly convex function f , f -divergence
Df(p,q) satisfies information monotonicity so that for any transition matrix θ ∈R∣Σ∣×∣Σ∣, Df(p,q) ≥
Df(θTp, θTq).
Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ,σ′, σ′′ such that p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) ≠
q(σ′′)
q(σ′) and
θσ′,σp(σ′) > 0, θσ′′,σp(σ′′) > 0.
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The proof is in the appendix for reference.
Definition 2.7. Given two signals σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ, we say two probability measures p,q over Σ can
distinguish σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ if p(σ′) > 0, p(σ′′) > 0 and q(σ′)
p(σ′) ≠
q(σ′′)
p(σ′′)
Fact 2.6 directly implies
Corollary 2.8. Given a transition matrix θ and two probability measures p,q that can distinguish
σ′, σ′′ ∈ Σ, if there exists σ ∈ Σ such that θ(σ′, σ), θ(σ′′, σ) > 0, we have Df(p,q) > Df(θTp, θTq)
when f is a strictly convex function.
Now we introduce two f -divergences in common use: KL divergence, and Total variation Dis-
tance.
Example 2.9 (KL divergence). Choosing − log(x) as the convex function f(x), f -divergence be-
comes KL divergence DKL(p,q) = ∑σ p(σ) log p(σ)q(σ)
Example 2.10 (Total Variation Distance). Choosing ∣x−1∣ as the convex function f(x), f -divergence
becomes Total Variation Distance Dtvd(p,q) = ∑σ ∣p(σ) − q(σ)∣
Proper scoring rules [29, 10] A scoring rule PS ∶ Σ ×∆Σ → R takes in a signal σ ∈ Σ and a
distribution over signals p ∈ ∆Σ and outputs a real number. A scoring rule is proper if, whenever
the first input is drawn from a distribution p, then p will maximize the expectation of PS over
all possible inputs in ∆Σ to the second coordinate. A scoring rule is called strictly proper if this
maximum is unique. We will assume throughout that the scoring rules we use are strictly proper.
Slightly abusing notation, we can extend a scoring rule to be PS ∶ ∆Σ ×∆Σ → R by simply taking
PS(p,q) = Eσ←p(σ,q). We note that this means that any proper scoring rule is linear in the first
term.
Example 2.11 (Log Scoring Rule [29, 10]). Fix an outcome space Σ for a signal σ. Let q ∈∆Σ be
a reported distribution. The Logarithmic Scoring Rule maps a signal and reported distribution to a
payoff as follows:
L(σ,q) = log(q(σ)).
Let the signal σ be drawn from some random process with distribution p ∈∆Σ.
Then the expected payoff of the Logarithmic Scoring Rule
Eσ←p[L(σ,q)] =∑
σ
p(σ) log q(σ) = L(p,q)
This value will be maximized if and only if q = p.
3 An Information Theoretic Mechanism Design Framework
The original idea of peer prediction [21] is based on a clever insight: every agent’s information is
related to her peers’ information and therefore can be checked using her peers’ information. Inspired
by this, we propose a natural yet powerful information theoretic mechanism design idea—paying
every agent the “mutual information” between her reported information and her peer’s reported in-
formation where the “mutual information” should be information-monotone—any “data processing”
on the two random variables will decrease the “mutual information” between them.
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Definition 3.1 (Information-monotone mutual information). We say MI is information-monotone
if and only if for any random variables X ∶ Ω↦ ΣX and Y ∶ Ω↦ ΣY :
Symmetry MI(X;Y ) =MI(Y ;X);
Non-negativity MI(X;Y ) is always non-negative and is 0 if X is independent with Y ;
Data processing inequality for any transition probability M ∈ R∣ΣX ∣×∣ΣX ∣, when Y is independent
with M(X) conditioning on X, MI(M(X);Y ) ≤MI(X;Y ).
We say MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to a probability measure P ∈ ∆ΣX×ΣY if
when the joint distribution over X and Y is P , for any non-permutation M , when Y is independent
with M(X) conditioning on X, MI(M(X);Y ) <MI(X;Y ).
Definition 3.2 (Conditional mutual information). Given three random variables X,Y,Z, we define
MI(X;Y ∣Z) as
∑
z
Pr[Z = z]MI(X;Y ∣Z = z)
where MI(X;Y ∣Z = z) ∶=MI(X ′;Y ′) where Pr[X ′ = x,Y ′ = y] = Pr[X = x,Y = y∣Z = z].
We now provide a paradigm for designing information elicitation mechanisms—the Mutual In-
formation Paradigm. We warn the reader that this paradigm represents some “wishful thinking” in
that is it clear the paradigm cannot compute the payments given the reports.
Mutual Information Paradigm (MIP(MI)) Given a general setting (n,Σ),
Report For each agent i, she is asked to provide her private information Ψi. We denote the actual
information she reports as Ψˆi.
Payment/Information Score We uniformly randomly pick a reference agent j ≠ i and denote
his report as Ψˆj. Agent i is paid by her information score
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
where MI is information-monotone.
Given a general setting (n,Σ), we say MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to prior
Q if for every pair i, j, MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to Q(Ψi,Ψj).
Theorem 3.3. Given a general setting (n,Σ), when MI is (strictly) information-monotone (with
respect to every agent’s prior), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MI) is (strictly) dominantly
truthful, (strictly) truth-monotone 3.
Theorem 3.3 almost immediately follows from the data processing inequality of the mutual
information. The key observation in the proof is that applying any strategy to the information is
essentially data processing and thus erodes information.
Note that the Mutual Information Paradigm is not a mechanism since it requires the mechanism
to know the full joint distribution over all agents’ random private information while agents only
report (or even have access to) a realization / sample of the random private information. Rather,
if we design mechanisms such that the payment in the mechanism is an unbiased estimator of
the payment in Mutual Information Paradigm, the designed mechanisms will obtain the desirable
properties immediately according to Theorem 3.3. In the future sections, we will see how to design
such mechanisms in both the multi-question and single-question settings.
3We assume that agents do not need effort to receive the private signals in this section and will extend the
framework to the non-zero effort setting in Section 4.
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Proof. For each agent i, for any strategy si she plays, comparing with the case she honestly reports
Ψi, her expected information score is
∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) =∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) ≤∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj)
sinceMI is information-monotone. Thus, MIP(MI) is dominantly truthful whenMI is information-
monotone.
For the strictness guarantee, we need to show when agent i believes at least one agent tells the
truth, for agent i, any non-permutation strategy will strictly decrease her expected payment. Let’s
assume that agent i believes agent j0 ≠ i plays T. When MI is strictly information-monotone with
respect to every agent’s prior, MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to Qi(Ψi,Ψj0) as
well. Then the inequality of the above formula is strict if agent i plays a non-permutation strategy
si since MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj0) =MI(si(Ψi);Ψj0) <MI(Ψi,Ψj0).
Thus, when MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to every agent’s prior, MIP(MI)
is strictly dominantly truthful.
Fixing other agents’ strategies except agent k, for i ≠ k, agent i’s expected payment is
∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) = ∑
j≠i,k
1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) + 1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆk)
≤ ∑
j≠i,k
1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) + 1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi;Ψk).
Thus, agent i’s expected payment decreases when truthful agent k changes to play a non-truthful
strategy. For i = k, the dominantly truthful property already shows agent i = k’s expected payment
will decrease when truthful agent k changes to play a non-truthful strategy. Therefore when MI is
information-monotone, MIP(MI) is truth-monotone.
For the strictness guarantee, when MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to every
agent’s prior, if truthful agent k changes to play a non-permutation strategy sk, then a truthful
agent i’s expected payment will strictly decrease since MI(Ψi; sk(Ψk)) < MI(Ψi;Ψk) if sk is a
non-permutation strategy and MI is strictly information-monotone.
Therefore, when MI is (strictly) information-monotone (with respect to every agent’s prior),
MIP(MI) is (strictly) truth-monotone.
It remains to design the information-monotone mutual information measure.
3.1 f-mutual Information
Given two random variables X,Y , let UX,Y and VX,Y be two probability measures where UX,Y
is the joint distribution of (X,Y ) and V is the product of the marginal distributions of X and Y .
Formally, for every pair of (x, y),
UX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x,Y = y] VX,Y (X = x,Y = y) = Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y].
If UX,Y is very different with VX,Y , the mutual information between X and Y should be high
since knowing X changes the belief for Y a lot. If UX,Y equals to VX,Y , the mutual information
between X and Y should be zero since X is independent with Y . Intuitively, the “distance” between
UX,Y and VX,Y represents the mutual information between them.
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Definition 3.4 (f -mutual information). The f -mutual information between X and Y is defined as
MIf(X;Y ) =Df(UX,Y ,VX,Y )
where Df is f -divergence.
Example 3.5 (KL divergence and I(⋅; ⋅)). Choosing f -divergence as KL divergence, f -mutual in-
formation becomes the Shannon (conditional) mutual information [5]
I(X;Y ) ∶=MIKL(X;Y ) =∑
x,y
Pr[X = x,Y = y] log Pr[X = x,Y = y]
Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y]
I(X;Y ∣Z) ∶=MIKL(X;Y ∣Z) =∑
x,y
Pr[X = x,Y = y,Z = z] log Pr[X = x,Y = y∣Z = z]
Pr[X = x∣Z = z]Pr[Y = y∣Z = z] .
Example 3.6 (Total Variation Distance and MItvd(⋅; ⋅)). Choosing f -divergence as Total Variation
Distance, f -mutual information becomes
MItvd(X;Y ) ∶=∑
x,y
∣Pr[X = x,Y = y] −Pr[X = x]Pr[Y = y]∣.
For the strictness guarantee, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.7 (Fine-grained distribution). P ∈ ∆ΣX×ΣY is a fine-grained joint distribution over
X and Y if for every two distinct pairs (x, y), (x′, y′), UX,Y (X,Y ) ∶= P (X,Y ) and VX,Y (X,Y ) ∶=
P (X)P (Y ) can distinguish (see Definition 2.7) (x, y) and (x′, y′).
Theorem 3.8 (General data processing inequality). When f is strictly convex, f -mutual informa-
tionMIf is information-monotone and strictly information-monotone with respect to all fine-grained
joint distributions over X and Y .
Definition 3.9 (Fine-grained prior). Given general setting (n,Σ), Q is fine-grained prior if for
every pair i, j, Q(Ψi,Ψj) is a fine-grained joint distribution over Ψi and Ψj.
Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.8 imply the below corollary.
Corollary 3.10. Given a general setting (n,Σ), when f is (strictly) convex (and every agent’s
prior is fine-grained), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MIf ) is (strictly) dominantly truthful,
(strictly) truth-monotone.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. We will apply the information monotonicity of f -divergence to show the data
processing inequality of f -mutual information. We first introduce several matrix operations to ease
the presentation of the proof.
Definition 3.11 (vec operator [11]). The vec operator creates a column vector vec(A) from a matrix
A by stacking the column vectors of A.
Definition 3.12 (Kronecker Product [11]). The Kronecker product of two matrices A ∈ Rm×n,
B ∈ Rp×q is defined as the mp × nq matrix A⊗B = {Ai,jB} =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
A11B . . . A1nB
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Am1B . . . AmnB
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Fact 3.13 (vec operator and Kronecker Product [27]). For any matrices A ∈ Rn1×n2 , X ∈ Rn2×n3 ,
B ∈ Rn3×n4, vec(AXB) = BT ⊗Avec(X).
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Let X ∶ Ω ↦ ΣX , Y ∶ Ω ↦ ΣY be two random variables. UX,Y and VX,Y can be seen as two
ΣX ×ΣY matrices. Let M be a ∣ΣX ∣ × ∣ΣX ∣ transition matrix.
We define ΣX,Y as ΣX ×ΣY .
Note that the vectorization of the matrix that represents the probability measure over X and
Y will not change the probability measure. Thus,
Df(UM(X),Y , VM(X),Y ) =Df(vec(UM(X),Y ),vec(VM(X),Y )).
We define I as a ∣ΣY ∣× ∣ΣY ∣ identity matrix. For any transition matrixM , by simple calculations,
we can see the Kronecker product between M and the identity matrix I is a transition matrix as
well.
When Y is independent withM(X) conditioning onX, for any probability measure P ∈∆ΣX×ΣY
on X and Y ,
P (M(X) = x′, Y = y) =∑
x
P (M(X) = x′∣X = x,Y = y)P (X = x,Y = y) (1)
=∑
x
P (M(X) = x′∣X = x)P (X = x,Y = y)
(Y is independent with M(X) conditioning on X)
MIf(M(X);Y ) =Df(UM(X),Y , VM(X),Y ) (2)
=Df(vec(UM(X),Y ),vec(VM(X),Y ))
=Df(vec(MTUX,Y I),vec(MTV(X),Y I))
(equation (1), replacing P by UX,Y and VX,Y )
=Df(IT ⊗MTvec(UX,Y ), IT ⊗MTvec(UX,Y )) (Fact 3.13)
≤Df(vec(UX,Y ),vec(VX,Y )) (information monotonicity of f -divergence)
=Df(UX,Y , VX,Y )
=MIf(X;Y )
Now we show the strictness guarantee. WhenM is a non-permutation matrix, Θ ∶= (IT⊗MT )T =
M ⊗ I is a non-permutation matrix as well. Thus there must exist (x, y), (x′, y′), (x′′, y′′) such
that both Θ((x, y), (x′, y′)) and Θ((x, y), (x′′, y′′)) are strictly positive where (x′, y′) ≠ (x′′, y′′).
According to the definition of fine-grained prior (see Definition 3.9 ), UX,Y and VX,Y can distinguish(x′, y′) and (x′, y′). Then Corollary 2.8 implies that the inequality in (2) is strict.
4 Extending the Framework to the Zero-one Effort Model
This section extends the information theoretic framework to the situations (e.g peer grading) where
agents need a certain amount of effort to obtain the private signals.
Assumption 4.1 (zero-one effort model). We assume that for each agent i, she can either invest
full effort ei to receive the private signal or invest no effort and receive a useless signal which is
independent with other agents’ private signals.
We define each agent’s utility as her payment / reward minus her effort.
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For each agent i, we say she plays effort strategy λi if and only if she invests full effort with
probability λi and no effort otherwise. We say she plays a pure (mixed) effort strategy if λi = 0,1
(0 < λi < 1). One example of playing a mixed effort strategy is that in the peer grading case, the
students only grade some of the homework carefully and give random grades for other homework.
Given a mechanism M for setting (n,Σ), for each agent i, conditioning receiving the private
signal σi, we define her strategy si as a mapping s from σi (private signal) to a probability distribution
over R. Thus, if agent i’s effort strategy and strategy are (λi, si), she will invest full effort for λi
fraction of time and for the time she invests full effort, she plays strategy si.
In the non-zero effort situation, we focus on incentivizing the full efforts of agents and would
like to pursue a stronger property—the (strictly) informative-truthful property—rather than the
strictly truthful property since it is not reasonable for every agent to assume everyone else invests
full effort and tells the truth in the current situation.
Mechanism Design Goals
(Strictly) Informative-truthful A mechanism M is (strictly) informative-truthful if for every
agent, given that everyone else either always invests no effort or always invests full effort and
plays T, she can maximize her expected utility by either always investing no effort or always
investing full effort and playing T (and obtain strictly lower utility by always investing full
effort and playing a non-truthful strategy).
(Strictly) Dominantly informative A mechanism M is dominantly informative if for every
agent, no matter what effort strategies and strategies other agents play, she can maximize
her expected utility by either always investing no effort or always investing full effort and
plays a permutation strategy. A mechanism M is strictly dominantly informative if for every
agent, if she believes at least one other agent will always invest full effort and play T, she will
obtain strictly lower expected payment via playing a non-permutation strategy than playing
T when she always invests full effort.
(Strictly) Effort-monotone A mechanism M is (strictly) effort-monotone if for every agent, her
optimal payment is (strictly) higher if (strictly) more other agents invest full effort and play
T.
Just desserts A mechanism M has the just desserts property if each agent’s expected payment is
always non-negative and her expected payment is zero if she invests no effort.
In the zero-one effort model, if an agent believes that everyone else invests no effort, it is too
much to ask her to invest full effort in an information elicitation mechanism without verification.
The below observation shows that if a rational agent believes that sufficiently many other agents
invest full effort and play T, she will always invest full effort and play T as well.
Observation 4.2. If a mechanism is dominantly informative and strictly effort-monotone, for every
rational agent i, there is a threshold ηi such that if she believes the number of truth-telling agents
is above ηi, she will invest full effort and play a permutation strategy. For a fixed prior, ηi is an
increasing function of ei.
The observation is implied by the fact that the utility equals the payment minus the effort. An
agent who needs less effort to access the private information has lower threshold.
We require an additional property to achieve the above mechanism design goals.
Definition 4.3 (Convex mutual information). We say MI is convex if and only if for any random
variables X1,X2, Y , for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, let Bλ be an independent Bernoulli variable such that Bλ = 1
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with probability λ and 0 with probability 1 − λ. Let X be a random variable such that if Bλ = 1,
X =X1, otherwise, X =X2,
MI(X;Y ) ≤ λMI(X1;Y ) + (1 − λ)MI(X2;Y ).
Theorem 4.4. Given a general setting (n,Σ) with assumption 4.1, whenMI is convex and (strictly)
information-monotone (with respect to every agent’s prior), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MI)is
(strictly) dominantly informative, (strictly) effort-monotone and has the just desserts property.
Proof. In MIP(MI), agents always have non-negative expected payments since MI is always non-
negative. When the other agent invests no effort, according to Assumption 4.1, her information is
useless and independent with other agents’ private signals. Thus, her expected payment is 0 since
MI(X;Y ) = 0 when X is independent with Y .
When agent i plays effort strategy λi and conditioning on she invests full effort, she plays strategy
si; conditioning on she invests no effort, she reports random variable X, her expected utility is
∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) − λiei
≤∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
λiMI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) + (1 − λi)MI(X; Ψˆj) − λiei (MI is convex)
= λi(∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) − ei) (Zero effort implies no information / Assumption 4.1)
≤ λi(∑
j≠i
1
n − 1
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) − ei) (MI is information-monotone)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
≤∑j≠i 1n−1MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) − ei if ∑j≠i 1n−1MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) > ei
≤ 0 if ∑j≠i 1n−1MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) ≤ ei
Therefore, no matter what effort strategies and strategies other agents play, agent i can maximize
her expected utility by either always investing no effort or always investing full effort and playing a
permutation strategy.
For the strictness guarantee, we need to show that if some agent i believes at least one other
agent tells the truth, then any non-permutation strategy will strictly decrease agent i’s expected
payment. Let’s assume that agent i believes agent j0 ≠ i plays T. When MI is strictly information-
monotone with respect to every agent’s prior, MI is strictly information-monotone with respect to
Qi(Ψi,Ψj0) as well. Then if agent i always invests full effort and plays a non-permutation strategy
si, MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj0) = MI(si(Ψi);Ψj0) < MI(Ψi,Ψj0) which implies that in this case, agent i’s
expected payment is strictly less than her expected payment in the case when she always invest full
effort and plays a permutation strategy.
Thus, when MI is convex and (strictly) information-monotone (with respect to every agent’s
prior), MIP(MI) is (strictly) dominantly informative.
It remains to show the (strictly) effort-monotone property. In order to show the effort-monotone
property, we need to show that for every agent i, fixing other agents’ strategies except agent k, if
agent k invests full effort and play her optimal strategy T, agent i’s optimal payment increases
comparing with the case agent k does not invest full effort.
When agent k does not always invest full effort, agent i’s optimal payment is proportional to
∑
j≠i
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) = ∑
j≠i,k
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) +MI(Ψi; Ψˆk) ≤ ∑
j≠i,k
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj) +MI(Ψi;Ψk)
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when MI is convex and information-monotone. When MI is strictly information-monotone with
respect to every agent’s prior, with a similar proof as that of the strictly dominantly informative
property, we can see the inequality in the above formula is strict.
Thus, when MI is convex and (strictly) information-monotone (with respect to every agent’s
prior), MIP(MI) is (strictly) effort-monotone.
Fact 4.5 (Convexity of f -mutual information). For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, for any random variables
X1,X2, Y , let Bλ be an independent Bernoulli variable such that Bλ = 1 with probability λ and 0
with probability 1 − λ. Let X be a random variable such that if Bλ = 1, X =X1, otherwise, X =X2,
MIf(X;Y ) ≤ λMIf(X1;Y ) + (1 − λ)MIf(X2;Y ).
Proof. Based on the definition of X,
UX,Y = λUX1,Y + (1 − λ)UX2,Y VX,Y = λVX1,Y + (1 − λ)VX2,Y .
Combining the joint convexity of Df (Fact 2.5) and the fact that MI
f(X;Y ) =Df(UX,Y , VX,Y ),
MIf(X;Y ) ≤ λMIf(X1;Y ) + (1 − λ)MIf(X2;Y ).
Corollary 4.6. Given a general setting (n,Σ) with assumption 4.1, when f is (strictly) convex
(and every agent’s prior is fine-grained), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(MIf ) is (strictly)
dominantly informative, (strictly) effort-monotone and has the just desserts property.
5 Bregman Mutual Information
It is naturally to ask whether in addition to f -divergence, can we use another commonly used
divergence—Bregman divergence DPS—to define an information-monotone information measure.
Since the general Bregman divergence may not satisfy information monotonicity, the answer is
likely to be negative. However, surprisingly, by properly using the Bregman divergence, we can ob-
tain a new family of information measures BMIPS that satisfies almost all information-monotone
properties of f -mutual information except the symmetry and one half of the data processing in-
equality. Therefore, by plugging BMIPS into the Mutual Information Paradigm, we may lose the
focal property but can preserve the dominantly truthful property.
Bregman Divergence [4, 10] Bregman divergence DPS ∶ ∆Σ × ∆Σ → R is a non-symmetric
measure of the difference between distribution p ∈∆Σ and distribution q ∈∆Σ and is defined to be
DPS(p,q) = PS(p,p) − PS(p,q)
where PS is a proper scoring rule (see the definition of PS in Section 2.3).
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5.1 Bregman Mutual Information
Inspired by the f -mutual information, we can first try DPS(UX,Y ,VX,Y ) to define the Bregman
mutual information. However, since the Bregman divergence may not satisfy the information mono-
tonicity, this idea does not work. Intuitively, more information implies a more accurate prediction.
Inspired by this intuition, we define Bregman mutual information between X and Y as an accuracy
gain—the accuracy of the posterior Pr[Y∣X] minus the accuracy of the prior Pr[Y]. With this
definition, if X changes the belief for Y a lot, then the Bregman mutual information between them
is high; if X is independent with Y , Pr[Y∣X] = Pr[Y], then the Bregman mutual information
between them is zero.
We define UY ∣X=x and UY as two probability distribution over Y such that
UY ∣X=x(Y = y) = Pr[Y = y∣X = x] UY (Y = y) = Pr[Y = y].
Definition 5.1 (Bregman mutual information). The Bregman mutual information between X and
Y is defined as
BMIPS(X;Y ) = EXDPS(UY ∣X ,UY ) = EXPS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y∣X]) − PS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y]).
Bridging log scoring rule and Shannon mutual information Inspired by the definition of
Bregman mutual information, we will show a novel connection between log scoring rule and Shannon
information theory concepts—the log scoring rule can be used to construct an unbiased estimator
of (conditional) Shannon mutual information. A powerful application of this connection is the
information theoretic reconstruction of Prelec [22] (Section 7.2.2).
The definition of Bregman mutual information says that the accuracy gain measured by a proper
scoring rule PS equals the information gain measured by the (conditional) Bregman mutual infor-
mation BMIPS. The below theorem (Theorem 5.2) shows that we can bridge the log scoring
rule and Shannon mutual information by showing the accuracy gain measured by log scoring rule
equals the information gain measured by (conditional) Shannon mutual information. Therefore, like
f -mutual information, Bregman mutual information also generalizes Shannon mutual information
(Corollary 5.3).
Theorem 5.2 (expected accuracy gain = information gain). For random variables X,Y,Z, when
predicting Y , the logarithm score of prediction Pr[Y ∣Z,X] minus the logarithm score of prediction
Pr[Y ∣Z]
EX,Y,ZL(Y,Pr[Y ∣Z,X]) −L(Y,Pr[Y ∣Z]) = I(X;Y ∣Z)
where L ∶ Σ ×∆Σ ↦ R is the log scoring rule and I(X;Y ∣Z) is the Shannon mutual information
between X and Y conditioning on Z.
Proof.
EX,Y,ZL(Y,Pr[Y ∣Z,X]) −L(Y,Pr[Y ∣Z])
= ∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x,Y = y,Z = z] log(Pr[Y = y∣Z = z,X = x]
Pr[Y = y∣Z = z] )
= ∑
x,y,z
Pr[X = x,Y = y,Z = z] log( Pr[Y = y,X = x∣Z = z]
Pr[Y = y∣Z = z]Pr[X = x∣Z = z])
= I(X;Y ∣Z)
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Recall that the conditional mutual information (Definition 3.2) is defined as
∑
z
Pr[Z = z]MI(X;Y ∣Z = z).
Thus,
BMIPS(X;Y ∣Z) = EX,ZPS(Pr[Y∣X,Z],Pr[Y∣X,Z]) −PS(Pr[Y∣X,Z],Pr[Y∣Z])
which is the accuracy of posterior Pr[Y∣X,Z] minus the accuracy of prior Pr[Y∣Z]. Therefore,
Fact 5.2 directly implies Corollary 5.3.
Corollary 5.3. BMIL(⋅,⋅)(X;Y ∣Z) = I(X;Y ∣Z) where BMIL(⋅,⋅) is a Bregman mutual information
that chooses Log scoring rule L(⋅, ⋅) as the proper scoring rule.
Definition 5.4 (Quasi Information-monotone mutual information). We sayMI is quasi information-
monotone if and only if it is always non-negative and satisfies the data processing inequality for the
first entry.
A quasi information-monotone mutual information may not be symmetric. Thus, even if it
satisfies the data processing inequality for the first entry, it may not satisfy the data processing
inequality for the second entry which means data processing methods operating on Y may increase
MI(X;Y ).
Theorem 5.5. The Bregman mutual information is quasi information-monotone.
Intuitively, more information about X provides a more accurate prediction for random variable
Y . That is, Pr[Y∣M(X)] is less accurate than Pr[Y∣X]. We will show the property of the proper
scoring rules directly implies the above intuition and then the quasi information-monotonicity of
BMIPS follows.
Proof. The definition of proper scoring rules implies the non-negativity of Bregman divergence as
well as that of Bregman mutual information.
For any transition probability M that operates on X,
BMIPS(M(X);Y ) = EM(X)PS(Pr[Y∣M(X)],Pr[Y∣M(X)]) − PS(Pr[Y∣M(X)],Pr[Y])
= EX,M(X)PS(Pr[Y∣X,M(X)],Pr[Y∣M(X)]) − PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y])
(PS is linear for the first entry)
= EX,M(X)PS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y∣M(X)]) − PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y])
(conditioning on X, M(X) is independent with Y )
≤ EXPS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y∣X]) − PS(Pr[Y],Pr[Y]) (PS is proper)
= EXPS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y∣X]) − PS(Pr[Y∣X],Pr[Y])
= BMIPS(X;Y )
Theorem 5.6. Given a general setting (n,Σ), whenMI is quasi information-monotone, the Mutual
Information Paradigm MIP(MI) is dominantly truthful.
16
Proof. For each agent i, for any strategy si she plays, comparing with the case she honestly reports
Ψi, her expected information score is
∑
j≠i
MI(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) =∑
j≠i
MI(si(Ψi); Ψˆj) ≤∑
j≠i
MI(Ψi; Ψˆj)
which is less than if she had reported truthfully since quasi information-monotone MI has data
processing inequality for the first entry.
Corollary 5.7. Given a general setting (n,Σ), the Mutual Information Paradigm MIP(BMIPS)
is dominantly truthful.
Unfortunately, Bregman mutual information may not be convex. Thus, we cannot extend the
analysis for the zero-one effort model to the Bregman mutual information and obtain the dominantly
informative property.
6 Multi-Question, Detail Free, Minimal Setting
In this section, we introduce the multi-question setting which was previously studied in Dasgupta
and Ghosh [7] and Radanovic and Faltings [24]: n agents are assigned the same T questions (multi-
questions). For each question k, each agent i receives a private signal σki ∈ Σ about question k
and is asked to report this signal. We call this setting (n,T,Σ).
We see mechanisms in which agents are not required to report their forecasts for other agents’
answer (minimal), and were the mechanism does not know the agents’ priors (detail free). Agent i
may lie and report σˆki ≠ σ
k
i . Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] give the following example for this setting: n
workers are asked to check the quality of m goods, they may receive signal “high quality” or “low
quality”.
Agents have priors for questions. Each agent i believes agents’ private signals for question k are
chosen from a joint distribution Qki over Σ
n. Note that different agents may have different priors
for the same question.
We consider the zero-one effort model (Assumption 4.1) in this setting. For each agent i, before
she picks her effort strategy, she believes in expectation she will invest effort eki for question k.
In the multi-question setting, people usually make the below assumption:
Assumption 6.1 (A Priori Similar and Random Order). For any i, any k ≠ k′, Qki = Q
k′
i , e
k
i = e
k′
i .
Moreover, all questions appear in a random order, independently drawn for each agent.
This means agents cannot distinguish each question without the private signal they receive.
We define (Ψ1,Ψ2, ...,Ψn) as the joint random variables such that
Pr(Ψ1 = σ1,Ψ2 = σ2, ...,Ψn = σn)
equals the probability that agents 1,2, .., n receive private signals (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) correspondingly for
a question which is picked uniformly at random.
We define (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, ..., Ψˆn) as the joint random variables such that
Pr(Ψˆ1 = σˆ1, Ψˆ2 = σˆ2, ..., Ψˆn = σˆn)
equals the probability that agents 1,2, .., n reports signals (σˆ1, σˆ2, ..., σˆn) correspondingly a question
which is picked uniformly at random. Note that the joint distribution over (Ψˆ1, Ψˆ2, ..., Ψˆn) depends
on the strategies agents play.
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For each question k, each agent i’s effort strategy is λki and conditioning on that she invests full
effort ei, her strategy is s
k
i . We say agent i plays a consistent strategy if for any k, k
′, λki = λ
k′
i
and ski = s
k′
i .
Recall that in the minimal mechanism, the strategy corresponds to a transition matrix. We
define truth-telling T as the strategy where an agent truthfully reports her private signal for every
question. T corresponds to the identity matrix. We say agent i plays a permutation strategy if
there exists a permutation transition matrix π such that ski = π,∀k. Note that a permutation
strategy is a consistent strategy. We define a consistent strategy profile as the strategy profile
where all agents play a consistent strategy.
With the a priori similar and random order assumption, Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] make the below
observation:
Observation 6.2. [7] When questions are a priori similar and agents receive questions in random
order (Assumption 6.1), for every agent, using different strategies for different questions is the same
as a mixed consistent strategy.
With the above observation, it is sufficient to only consider the consistent strategy profiles.
6.1 The f-mutual Information Mechanism and Bregman mutual Information
Mechanism
In this section, we give direct applications of the Mutual Information Paradigm in multi-question
setting—the f -mutual information mechanism and the Bregman mutual information mechanism.
Both of them are a family of mechanisms that can be applied to the non-binary setting / multiple-
choices questions which generalize the mechanism in Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] that can only be
applied to the binary setting / binary choices questions. Moreover, both the f -mutual information
mechanism and the Bregman mutual information mechanism are dominantly truthful without con-
sidering efforts. Later we will map the mechanism in Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] to a special case of
the f -mutual information mechanism4.
f -mutual Information Mechanism MMIf Given a multi-question setting (n,T,Σ),
Report For each agent i, for each question k, she is asked to provide her private signal σki . We
denote the actual answer she reports as σˆki .
Payment/Information Score We arbitrarily pick a reference agent j ≠ i. We define a probability
measure P over Σ ×Σ such that T ∗ P (Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj) equals the number of questions that
agent i answers σi and agent j answers σj.
Agent i is paid by her information score
MIf(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
where (Ψˆi; Ψˆj) draws from the probability measure P .
Theorem 6.3. Given a multi-question setting (n,T,Σ) with the a priori similar and random order
assumption (6.1), when the number of questions is infinite, f is (strictly) convex (and every agent’s
4Although f -mutual information mechanism requires infinite number of question for clean analysis, with an extra
positively correlated assumption for the information structure, we can construct an unbiased estimator for f -mutual
information of the distribution via only 3 questions (See Section 1.3, Appendix A).
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prior is fine-grained), (i) without considering efforts, MMIf is detail free, minimal, (strictly) dom-
inantly truthful, (strictly) truth-monotone; (ii) with the zero-one effort assumption (4.1), MMIf is
detail free, minimal, (strictly) dominantly informative, (strictly) effort-monotone and has the just
desserts property.
Proof. We would like to show that the f -mutual information mechanism is the same as MIP(MIf).
Then Corollary 4.6 directly implies the theorem.
Based on observation 6.2, it is sufficient to only consider the consistent strategy profiles. When
the number of questions is infinite and ∀i, agent i play the consistent strategy λi, si,
P (Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj) = Pr(Ψˆi = σi; Ψˆj = σj)
and Ψˆi = λisi(Ψi) + (1 − λi)Xi where Xi is a random variable that is independent with all other
agents’ private signals / strategies.
Therefore, with Assumption 6.1, when the number of questions is infinite, the f -mutual infor-
mation mechanism is the same as MIP(MIf) in the multi-question setting. Theorem 6.3 follows
immediately from Corollary 3.10, 4.6.
Bregman mutual Information MechanismMBMIPS We can define Bregman mutual informa-
tion mechanism via the same definition of f -mutual information except replacing MIf by BMIPS .
Corollary 5.7 directly imply the below theorem.
Theorem 6.4. Given a multi-question setting (n,T,Σ) with the a priori similar and random order
assumption (6.1), when the number of questions is infinite, without considering efforts, the Bregman
mutual information mechanism MBMIPS is detail free, minimal, dominantly truthful.
6.2 Mapping Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] into Our Information Theoretic Frame-
work
This section maps Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] to a special case of f -mutual information mechanism (in
the binary setting) with the f -mutual information using the specific f -divergence, total variation
distance. With the mapping, we can simplify the proof in Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] to a direct
application of our framework.
6.2.1 Prior Work
We first state the mechanism Md and the main theorem in Dasgupta and Ghosh [7].
Mechanism Md Agents are asked to report binary signals 0 or 1 for each question. Uniformly
randomly pick a reference agent j for agent i. We denote Ci as the set of questions agent i answered.
We denote Cj as the set of questions agent j answered. We denote Ci,j as the set of questions both
agent i and agent j answered. For each question k ∈ Ci,j that both agent i and agent j answered,
pick subsets A ⊆ Ci/k,B ⊆ Cj/(k ∪A) with ∣A∣ = ∣B∣ = d. If such A,B do not exist, agent i’s reward
is 0. Otherwise, we define ¯ˆσAi =
∑l∈A σˆ
l
i
∣A∣ to be agent i’s average answer for subset A,
¯ˆσBj =
∑l∈B σˆ
l
j
∣B∣ is
agent j’s average answer for subset B.
Agent i’s reward for each question k ∈ Ci,j is
Rki,j ∶= [σˆki ∗ σˆkj + (1 − σˆki ) ∗ (1 − σˆkj )] − [¯ˆσAi ∗ ¯ˆσBj + (1 − ¯ˆσAi ) ∗ (1 − ¯ˆσBj )]
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By simple calculations, essentially agent i’s reward for each question k ∈ Ci,j is the correlation
between her answer and agent j’s answer—E[ΨˆiΨˆj] −E[Ψˆi]E[Ψˆj].
Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] also make an additional assumption:
Assumption 6.5 (Positively Correlated). Each question k has a unknown ground truth ak and for
every agent i, with probability greater or equal to 1
2
, agent i receives private signal ak.
We succinctly interpret the main results of Dasgupta and Ghosh [7] as well as the results implied
by the main results into the below theorem.
Theorem 6.6. [7] Given an multi-question setting (n,T,Σ) with the a priori similar and random or-
der assumption (6.1), the positively correlated assumption (6.5), and the zero-one effort assumption
(4.1), when T ≥ d + 1, Md is informative-truthful, and strongly focal.
The parameter d can be any positive integer. Larger d will make the mechanism more robust.
We will see Md equals a special case of the f -mutual information mechanism only if agent i, j’s
reported answers are positively correlated. Thus, without considering efforts, Md is not dominantly
truthful while the f -mutual information mechanism is. Although Md only requires a small number
of questions, it only applies to binary choice questions, makes an extra assumption, and obtains
weaker properties than the f -mutual information mechanism.
6.2.2 Using Our Information Theoretic Framework to Analyze Dasgupta and Ghosh
[7]
Proof Outline We will first connect the expected payment in Md with a specific f -mutual
information—MItvd . Then the result follows from the information monotone property of f -mutual
information. Formally, we use the below claim to show the connection between mechanism Md and
f -mutual information mechanism.
Claim 6.7. [Md ≈MMItvd] With a priori similar and random order assumption, in Md, for every
pairs i, j, for every reward question k,
E[Rki,j] = 1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj)
if both of them play T;
E[Rki,j] ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
if one of them does not play T.
Claim 6.7 shows the connection between Md and MMItvd . The only difference between Md and
MMItvd is that for agents i, j, when one of the agent does not play T, the correlation between
their reports is upper-bounded by rather than equal to the tvd-mutual information. Therefore, in
Md, truth-telling is not a dominant strategy. But the information-monotone property of MI
tvd still
guarantees the informative truthful and strongly focal property of Md.
Proof of Theorem 6.6. We start to show the informative-truthful property of Md.
For every agent i, given that everyone else either invests no effort or plays T, either her reference
agent j invests no effort or plays T. If agent j invests no effort, agent i’s expected payment for each
reward question is
E[Rki,j] ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) = 0
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no matter what strategy agent i plays. Therefore, we only need to consider the case where agent
j plays T. In this case, we will use a proof that is similar with the proof of Theorem 4.4 which
applies the convexity and information-monotone property of f -mutual information. When agent i
plays effort strategy λi and conditioning on her investing full effort, she plays strategy si, agent i’s
expected payment for each reward question is
E[Rki,j] ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψˆi;Ψj) ≤ λi(1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj))
since MItvd is convex and information-monotone. Therefore, given agent i answers Ti questions,
let’s denote set Ji as the set of agents such that for any j ∈ Ji, we can construct size d subsets A,B
in Md for agent i and agent j.
The total expected utility of agent i is less than
⎛
⎝ ∑j∈Ji,λj=1,sj=TPr[j] ∑k∈Ci,j λi(
1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj))⎞⎠ − λiTiei.
When agent i invests full effort and plays T, agent i’s expected payment for each reward question
is 1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj) according to Claim 6.7. The total expected utility of agent i is equal to
⎛
⎝ ∑j∈Ji,λj=1,sj=TPr[j] ∑k∈Ci,j(
1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj))⎞⎠ − Tiei.
Note that the upper-bound of the total expected utility of agent i is a linear function of λi. Thus,
the agent will maximize her total expected utility by either always investing no effort (λi = 0) or
always investing full effort (λi = 1) and playing T. The choice depends on how many other agents
play T and the structure of the reward questions.
Thus, Md is informative-truthful. Moreover,
E[Rki,j] ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj) ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj)
Thus, the truth-telling strategy profile maximizes every agent’s expected payment among all
strategy profiles which implies Md is strongly focal.
Proof for Claim 6.7 We first show that
E[Rki,j] = 1
2
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj)
if both of agents i, j play T.
Note that by simple calculations, Assumption 6.5 implies that for any σ ∈ {0,1},
Pr[Ψj = σ∣Ψi = σ] ≥ Pr[Ψj = σ],
Pr[Ψj = σ∣Ψi = σ′] ≤ Pr[Ψj = σ],∀σ′ ≠ σ.
When both of agents i, j play T,
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12
MItvd(Ψi;Ψj) = 1
2
∑
σ,σ′
∣Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′] −Pr[Ψi = σ]Pr[Ψj = σ′]∣ (Definition of MItvd)
=
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′) (Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′] −Pr[Ψi = σ]Pr[Ψj = σ′])
+ 1(σ ≠ σ′) (Pr[Ψi = σ]Pr[Ψj = σ′] −Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ′]) (Assumption 6.5)
=∑
σ
(Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ] −Pr[Ψi = σ]Pr[Ψj = σ])
(Combining like terms, Pr[E] −Pr[¬E] = 2Pr[E] − 1)
= E[Rki,j] (Definition of Rki,j in Md)
The proof of
E[Rki,j] ≤ 1
2
MItvd(Ψˆi; Ψˆj)
is similar to above proof. We only need to replace Ψi by Ψˆi and change the second equation to
greater than, that is,
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
∣Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ′] −Pr[Ψˆi = σ]Pr[Ψˆj = σ′]∣
≥
1
2
∑
σ,σ′
1(σ = σ′) (Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ′] −Pr[Ψˆi = σ]Pr[Ψˆj = σ′])
+ 1(σ ≠ σ′) (Pr[Ψˆi = σ]Pr[Ψˆj = σ′] −Pr[Ψˆi = σ, Ψˆj = σ′]) . (∑∣x∣ ≥ ∑x)
We have finished the proof of Claim 6.7.
7 Single-Question, Detail Free, Common Prior, Non-minimal Set-
ting
In the single-question setting, agents are asked to answer a single question which means that the
mechanism can only obtain a single sample of all agents’ private information (Ψ1,Ψ2, ...,Ψn). We
assume that in the single-question setting, agents do not need to invest efforts to receive the private
signals. Thus, achieving the truthful and focal goals is sufficiently good in the single-question
setting.
Assumption 7.1 (Common Prior). We assume agents have a common prior—it is a common
knowledge that agents’ private signals for the question are chosen from a common joint distribution
Q over Σn.
Assumption 7.2 (Symmetric Prior). We assume agents have a symmetric prior Q—for any per-
mutation π ∶ [n]↦ [n],
Q(Ψ1 = σπ(1),Ψ2 = σπ(2), ...,Ψn = σπ(n)) = Q(Ψ1 = σ1,Ψ2 = σ2, ...,Ψn = σn)
Because we will assume that the prior is symmetric, we denote the prior expectation for the
fraction of agents who receives private signal σ by q(σ) and the posterior expectation for the
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fraction of agents who receives private signal σ, conditioning on one agent receiving signal σ′ by
q(σ∣σ′). We also define q = q(⋅) and qσ = q(⋅∣σ).
With the above assumptions, agents who receive the same private signals will have the same
prediction.
Assumption 7.3 (Informative Prior). We assume if agents have different private signals, they will
have different expectations for the fraction of at least one signal. That is for any σ ≠ σ′, there exists
σ′′ such that q(σ′′∣σ) ≠ q(σ′′∣σ′).
With the above assumptions, agents who receive different private signals will have different
predictions.
7.1 Warm up: the Original Peer Prediction
The original peer prediction method [21] makes a prediction on each agent’s behalf and pays each
agent according to the accuracy of the prediction based on her report. In this section, we will shift
the payment of the original peer prediction a little bit and show that in the shifted version, agents
are essentially paid by the Bregman mutual information between her information and her peers’
information when everyone tells the truth, which matches our Mutual Information Paradigm.
7.1.1 Prior Work
Miller et al. [21] propose the original peer prediction method to solve the “motivating minority”
problem. They require the knowledge of the common and symmetric prior such that the mechanism
can derive qσ given the private signal σ.
Original Peer Prediction [21] Each agent i is asked to report her private signal σi. We denote
σˆi as her actual reported signal. The mechanism calculates the prediction qσˆi on agent i’s behalf
and uniformly randomly pick a reference agent j ≠ i to pay agent i the accuracy of the prediction
qσˆi—
PS(σˆj ,qσˆi)
Theorem 7.4. [21] The original peer prediction [21] is minimal and strictly truthful with known
common, symmetric, informative prior.
7.1.2 The Shifted Peer Prediction Method (SPPM)
Recall that we defined q as the prior prediction for other agents’ received signals before receiving
any private signals. The mechanism, which knows the prior, can also derive the prior prediction q.
We shift the original peer prediction subtracting PS(σˆj ,q) from each agent i’s original payment.
That is, each agent i is paid the accuracy of the posterior minus that of the prior
PS(σˆj,qσˆi) − PS(σˆj ,q).
In this shifted peer prediction mechanism, agents cannot get something for nothing.
Theorem 7.5. The shifted peer prediction mechanism is minimal and strictly truthful. When ev-
eryone tells the truth, each agent i’s expected payment is
BMIPS(Ψi;Ψj)
where agent j is her reference agent.
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Proof. Since PS(σˆj ,q) is independent with agent i’s action, the equilibria of the shifted peer predic-
tion mechanism are the same as that of the original peer prediction mechanism. Thus, the shifted
peer prediction mechanism is strictly truthful.
When everyone tells the truth, for every i, qσˆi = qσi = Pr[⋅∣Ψi = σi] where we use the prior Q as
the probability measure over all agents’ private signals, thus agent i expected payment is
EΨi,ΨjPS(Ψj , P r[Ψj ∣Ψi]) −PS(Ψj , P r[Ψj])
= BMIPS(Ψi;Ψj) (Definition 5.1)
For SPPM, when agents use other strategies rather than truth-telling, we cannot obtain the
result that each agent is paid the mutual information between her reported signal and other agents’
reported signal unless both the prior and posterior are updated correctly with the strategy knowledge.
However, the mechanism does not know the strategy profile agents will play. Therefore, SPPM is
not focal even if we use the log scoring rule. In the next section, we will see the Bayesian truth
serum cleverly solves this “unknown strategy” problem by setting up new prior and posterior.
7.2 Mapping Bayesian Truth Serum into Our Information Theoretic Framework
Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) [22] rewards the agents whose answer is “surprisingly popular”. In this
section, we will show that in BTS, essentially each agent is paid the mutual information between
her information and the aggregated information conditioning a random peer’s information which
matches our Mutual Information Paradigm. We show this via the connection we found between the
log scoring rule and Shannon mutual information—the accuracy gain equals the information gain.
Mapping Bayesian Truth Serum into our information theoretic framework substantially simplifies
the proof in Prelec [22] via directly applying the information-monotone property of Shannon mutual
information.
7.2.1 Prior Work
Prelec [22] proposes the Bayesian Truth Serum mechanism in the single-question setting. In addition
to the common prior and the symmetric prior assumptions, two additional assumptions are required:
Assumption 7.6 (Conditional Independence). We define the state of the world as a random variable
W ∶ Ω ↦ ∆Σ such that given that W = ω, agents’ private signals are independently and identically
distributed. That is, for every i, agent i receives signal σ with probability ω(σ).
Assumption 7.7 (Large Group). The number of agents is infinite.
We define a random variable Wˆ ∶ Ω↦ ∆Σ such that its outcome is the distribution over agents’
reported signals. The distribution over Wˆ dependes on all agents’ strategies. With the large group
assumption, when agents tell the truth, Wˆ =W .
BTS uses Wˆ as the posterior distribution and uses agents’ forecasts as the prior distribution,
and then rewards agents for giving signal reports that are “unexpectedly common” with respect to
this distribution. Intuitively, an agent will believe her private signal is underestimated by other
agents which means she will believe the actual fraction of her own private signal is higher than the
average of agents’ forecasts.
Prelec also proposes the signal-prediction framework for the design of detail free mechanism in
the single-question setting.
24
Signal-prediction framework [22] Given a setting (n,Σ) with a symmetric common prior Q,
the signal-prediction framework defines a game in which each agent i is asked to report his private
signal σi ∈ Σ and his prediction pi ∈ ∆Σ, a distribution over Σ, where pi = qσi . For any σ ∈ Σ,
pi(σ) is agent i’s (reported) expectation for the fraction of other agents who has received σ given
he has received σi. However, agents may not tell the truth. In this framework, the report space
R = Σ ×∆Σ. We define a report profile of agent i as ri = (σˆi, pˆi) ∈ R where σˆi is agent i’s reported
signal and pˆi is agent i’s reported prediction.
We would like to encourage truth-telling T, namely that agent i reports σˆi = σi, pˆi = qσi . To
this end, agent i will receive some payment νi(σˆi, pˆi, σˆ−i, pˆ−i) from the mechanism.
Mechanism Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS(α)) [22] The Bayesian Truth Serum (BTS) follows
the signal-prediction framework. Here, we introduce the payment of BTS. Each agent i has two
scores: a prediction score and an information score. BTS pays each agent
prediction score + α⋅ information score
where α > 1 To calculate the scores, for every agent i, the mechanism chooses a reference agent j ≠ i
uniformly at random. Agent i’s prediction score is
scorePre(ri, rj) ∶= L(σˆj , pˆi) − log fr(σˆj ∣σˆ−j) = log pˆi(σˆj) − log fr(σˆj ∣σˆ−j)
Note that only the log scoring rule part L(σˆj , pˆi) is related to agent i’s report. Based on the
property of the log scoring rule, for agent i, in order to maximize her prediction score, the best
pˆi(σ) should be her posterior expectation of the fraction of the agents who report σ rather than
receive.
Agent i’s information score is
scoreIm(ri, rj) ∶= log fr(σˆi∣σˆ−i)
pˆj(σˆi) = log fr(σˆi∣σˆ−i) − log pˆj(σˆi)
where fr(σˆi∣σˆ−i) is the fraction of all reported signals σˆ−i (excluding agent i) that agree with agent
i’s reported signal σˆi, which can be seen as the posterior expectation of the fraction of agents who
report σˆi conditioning on all agents’ reports, while pˆj(σˆi) is agent j’s posterior expectation of that
fraction conditioning on agent j’s private signal. Intuitively, the signals that actually occur more
than other agents believe they will receive a higher information score.
Now we restate the main theorem concerning Bayesian Truth Serum:
Theorem 7.8. [22] With the common prior, the symmetric prior, the conditional independence,
and the large group assumptions, BTS(α) is detail free, (i) truthful and (ii) the expected average in-
formation score when everyone tells the truth is higher than that in any other equilibrium. Moreover,
(iii) for α > 1, BTS is focal.
Prelec [22] uses some clever algebraic calculations to prove the main results. In the next section,
we will apply our “accuracy gain=information gain” observation to map Bayesian Truth Serum [22]
into our information theoretical framework and show results (ii) and (iii) via applying the data
processing inequality of Shannon mutual information. We put Prelec [22]’s proof for results (i) in
appendix since it is already sufficiently simple and not very related to our framework.
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7.2.2 Using Our Information Theoretic Framework to Analyze BTS
A key observation of BTS is that when agents report the optimal predictions, the average information
score is exactly the “accuracy gain”—the accuracy of the posterior prediction for a random agent’s
report conditioning on all agents’ reports, minus the accuracy of a random reference agent j’s
posterior prediction for the random agent’s report conditioning on agent j’s private signal. Based on
Lemma 5.2, this accuracy gain equals the Shannon mutual information between a random agent’s
reported signal and all agents’ reports conditioning on the random reference agent j’s private signal
Ψj = σj . Therefore, the expected information score can be represented as the form of Shannon
mutual information. We have similar analysis for the prediction score. We formally state the above
observation in Lemma 7.9. Aided by this lemma, we will show results (ii) and (iii) via applying the
information-monotone property of Shannon mutual information.
Lemma 7.9. In BTS, when agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information score and
prediction score are
I(W ;Ψi∣Ψj), −I(W ;Ψj ∣Ψi)
respectively, ∀j ≠ i. When the agents play a non-truthful equilibrium, we denote random variable Ψˆ
as the reported signal of an agent who is picked uniformly at random, the expected average informa-
tion score and prediction score are
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψj), −I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψi)
respectively, ∀i, j.
Proof. When agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information score is
EΨi,Ψj ,WL(Ψi, P r[Ψi∣W ]) −L(Ψi, P r[Ψi∣Ψj])
= EΨi,Ψj ,WL(Ψi, P r[Ψi∣W,Ψj]) −L(Ψi, P r[Ψi∣Ψj]) (Conditional independence)
= I(W ;Ψi∣Ψj) (Theorem 5.2 / Expected accuracy gain equals information gain)
when she is paired with reference agent j. Since the prior is symmetric, I(W ;Ψi∣Ψj) is independent
of the identity of j if j ≠ i.
In any equilibrium s, based on the properties of proper scoring rules, each agent j will always
maximize his expected prediction score by truthfully reporting his predictions. Moreover, for agent
j, his reference agent is picked uniformly at random. Therefore,
pˆj(σˆ) = Pr[Ψˆ = σˆ∣Ψj = σj]
where Ψˆ is the reported signal of an agent who is picked uniformly at random.
Then we can replace W,Ψi by Wˆ , Ψˆ in the above equations and prove that the expected average
information score is
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψj).
The analysis for the expected prediction score is the same as the above analysis except that we
need to exchange i and j.
Proof of Theorem 7.8 (ii), (iii). Based on Lemma 7.9, when agents play an equilibrium, the ex-
pected average information score equals
I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψj) =∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψj = σj)
≤∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ,W ; Ψˆ∣Ψj = σj) (Data processing inequality)
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Note that, when the number of agents is infinite, since every agent’s strategy is independent
with each other, we can see W determines Wˆ 5. Therefore,
∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(Wˆ ,W ; Ψˆ∣Ψj = σj)
=∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(W ; Ψˆ∣Ψj = σj)
≤∑
σj
Pr[Ψj = σj]I(W ;Ψi∣Ψj = σj),∀i ≠ j
(Data processing inequality and the symmetric prior assumption)
= I(W ;Ψi∣Ψj),∀i ≠ j
Thus, the expected average information score is maximized when everyone tells the truth.
It is left to show for α > 1, in BTS(α), the agent-welfare is maximized by truth-telling over all
equilibria. Lemma 7.9 shows that when the prior is symmetric, the sum of the expected prediction
scores equals the sum of the expected information scores in any equilibrium. Thus, when α > 1, the
agent welfare is proportional to the sum of the expected information scores which is maximized by
truth-telling over all equilibria.
It is natural to ask if we replace the −log in BTS’s information score by other convex functions,
what property of BTS we can still preserve. The below theorem shows that even though we may not
ganrantee the truthful property of BTS, the average expected information score is still monotone
with the amount of information for any convex function we use.
Theorem 7.10. If we replace the information score in BTS by f( pˆj(σˆi)
fr(σˆi ∣σˆ−i)
) where f is a convex
function, result (ii)—the expected average information score when everyone tells the truth is higher
than that in any other equilibrium—is preserved.
Proof. When agents tell the truth, each agent i’s expected information score is
EΨi,Ψj ,W f(Pr[Ψi∣Ψj]Pr[Ψi∣W ] )
= EΨi,Ψj ,W f( Pr[Ψi∣Ψj]Pr[Ψi∣W,Ψj]) (Conditional independence)
= EΨi,Ψj ,W f(Pr[Ψi∣Ψj]Pr[W ∣Ψj]Pr[Ψi,W ∣Ψj] )
=MIf(W ;Ψi∣Ψj)
In any equilibrium s, based on the properties of proper scoring rules, each agent j will always
maximize their prediction by truthfully report their predictions, thus,
pˆj(σˆ) = Pr[Ψˆ = σˆ∣Ψj = σj].
Then we can replace W,Ψi by Wˆ , Ψˆ in the above equations and prove that the expected average
information score is
MIf(Wˆ ; Ψˆ∣Ψj).
5When W = ω, Wˆ = 1
n ∑iM
T
i ω where M
T
i is the transpose matrix of the transition matrix corresponded to agent
i’s strategy for signal reporting, and the distribution ω is represented by a column vector.
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With the similar proof of Theorem 7.8, the theorem follow immediately from the data processing
inequality of f -mutual information.
BTS and SPPM Recall that SPPM has the “unknown strategy” problem—when agents play
other strategies, the mechanism needs to know the strategies to update the prior and posterior
correctly. Bayesian Truth Serum[22] cleverly solves this problem by asking agents their predictions
for other agents’ reported signals and setting the new prior as agents’ predictions and the new
posterior as the prediction conditioning on the aggregated information. Bayesian Truth Serum pays
agents according to the accuracy of the new posterior minus that of the new prior. In BTS, both
the new prior and new posterior will be automatically updated according to agents’ strategies when
agents play an equilibrium. Therefore, without the knowledge of the strategies, BTS is still focal.
8 Impossibility (Tightness) Results
In this section, we will show an impossibility result that implies the optimality of the information
theoretical framework. We will see when the mechanism knows no information about the prior
profile, no non-trivial mechanism has truth-telling as the unique “best” equilibrium. Thus, it is
too much to ask for a mechanism where truth-telling is paid strictly higher than any other non-
truthful equilibrium. The best we can hope is to construct a mechanism where truth-telling is
paid strictly higher than all non-truthful equilibria / strategy profiles excluding all permutation
strategy profiles (Definition 8.5) when the prior is symmetric; or all non-truthful equilibria / strategy
profiles excluding all generalized permutation strategy profiles (Definition 8.6) when the prior may
be asymmetric. Because permutation strategies seem unnatural, risky, and require the same amount
of effort as truth-telling these are still strong guarantees.
Actually we will show a much more general result in this section that is sufficiently strong to
imply the optimality of the framework. Recall that a mechanism is strictly focal if truth-telling is
strictly better than any other strategy profiles excluding generalized permutations strategy profiles.
The results of this section imply that no truthful detail free mechanism can pay truth-telling T
strictly better than all generalized permutations strategy profiles (Definition 8.6) no matter what
definition is the truth-telling strategy T.
We omit the prior in the definition of strategy before since we always fix the prior. However,
when proving the impossibility results, the prior is not fixed. Therefore, we use the original definition
of strategy in this section.
Definition 8.1 (Strategy). Given a mechanism M, we define the strategy of M for setting (n,Σ)
as a mapping s from (σ,Q) (private signal and prior) to a probability distribution over R.
(Generalized) Permutation Strategy Profiles A permutation π ∶ Σ ↦ Σ can be seen as
a relabelling of private information. Given two lists of permutations pi = (π1, π2, ..., πn), pi′ =(π′
1
, π′
2
, ..., π′n), we define the product of pi and pi′ as
pi ⋅pi
′
∶= (π1 ⋅ π′1, π2 ⋅ π′2, ..., πn ⋅ π′n)
where for every i, πi ⋅ π
′
i is the group product of πi and π
′
i such that πi ⋅ π
′
i is a new permutation
with πi ⋅ π
′
i(σ) = πi(π′i(σ)) for any σ.
We also define pi−1 as (π−1
1
, π−1
2
, ..., π−1n ).
By abusing notation a little, we define pi ∶ Q↦Q as a mapping from a prior Q to a generalized
permuted prior pi(Q) where for any σ1, σ2, ..., σn ∈ Σ,
pi(Q)(σ1, σ2, ..., σn) = Q(π−11 (σ1), π−12 (σ2), ..., π−12 (σn))
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where σi is the private signal of agent i. Notice that it follows that:
pi(Q)(π1(σ1), π2(σ2), ..., π2(σn)) = Q(σ1, σ2, ..., σn).
Intuitively, pi(Q) is the same as Q after the signals are relabelled according to pi.
Definition 8.2 (Permutation List Operator on Strategy). For every agent i, given her strategy is
si and a permutation list pi, we define pi(si) as the strategy such that pi(si)(σ,Q) = si(πi(σ),pi(Q))
for every private information σ and prior Q.
Definition 8.3 (Permutation List Operator on Strategy Profile). Given a permutation list pi, for
any strategy profile s, we define pi(s) as a strategy profile with pi(s) = (pi(s1),pi(s2), ...,pi(sn)).
Note that pi−1piQ = Q which implies pi−1pi(s) = s.
We say (π,π, ..., π) is a symmetric permutation list for any permutation π. For convenience, we
write (π,π, ..., π)(Q) as π(Q), (π,π, ..., π)(s) as π(s) and (π,π, ..., π)(s) as π(s).
We define a permutation strategy (profile) and then give a generalized version of this definition.
Definition 8.4 (Permutation Strategy ). We define a strategy s as a permutation strategy if there
exists a permutation π such that s = π(T).
Definition 8.5 (Permutation Strategy Profile ). We define a strategy profile s as a permutation
strategy profile if there exists a permutation π such that s = π(T).
Definition 8.6 (Generalized Permutation Strategy Profile). We define a strategy profile s as a
generalized permutation strategy profile if there exists a permutation list pi = (π1, π2, ..., πn) such
that s = pi(T) = (π1, π2, ..., πn)(T).
8.1 Tightness Proof
Definition 8.7. Given a prior profile Q = (Q1,Q2, ...,Qn) and a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, ..., sn),
and a mechanism M, for every agent i, we define
νMi (n,Σ,Q, s)
as agent i’s ex ante expected payment when agents play s and all agents’ private information is
drawn from Qi that is, from agent i’s viewpoint.
The impossibility result is stated as below:
Proposition 8.8. Let M be a mechanism that does not know the prior profile, then for any strategy
profile s, and any permutation list pi:
(1) s is a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium of M for any prior profile iff pi(s) is a strict Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of M for any prior profile.
(2) For every agent i, there exists a prior profile Q such that νMi (n,Σ,Q, s) ≤ νMi (n,Σ,Q,pi(s)).
Additionally, if the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above results only hold for any
symmetric permutation list (π,π, ..., π).
Proposition 8.8 implies
Corollary 8.9. Let M be a truthful mechanism, given truth-telling strategy T, when M knows no
information about the prior profile of agents, if there exists a permutation list pi such that pi(T) ≠ T,
T cannot be always paid strictly higher than all generalized permutation strategy profiles.
Additionally, if the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above results only hold for any
symmetric permutation list (π,π, ..., π) and all permutation strategy profiles.
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We note that the requirement that there exists pi such that pi(T) ≠ T only fails for very trivial
mechanisms where the truthfully reported strategy does not depend on the signal an agent receives.
The key idea to prove this theorem is what we refer to as Indistinguishable Scenarios:
Definition 8.10 (Scenario). We define a scenario for the setting (n,Σ) as a tuple (Q, s) where Q
is a prior profile, and s is a strategy profile.
Given mechanism M, for any scenario A = (QA, sA), we write νMiA (n,Σ,A) as agent iA’s ex ante
expected payment when agents play sA and all agents’ private signals are drawn from QiA .
For two scenarios A = (QA, sA), B = (QB, sB) for setting (n,Σ), let σA ∶= (σ1A , σ2A , ..., σnA) be
agents (1A,2A, ..., nA)’ private signals respectively in scenario A, σB ∶= (σ1B , σ2B , ..., σnB ) be agents(1B ,2B , ..., nB)’ private signals respectively in scenario B.
Definition 8.11 (Indistinguishable Scenarios). We say two scenarios A,B are indistinguishable
A ≈ B if there is a coupling of the random variables σA and σB such that ∀i, siA(σiA ,QiA) =
siB(σiB ,QiB) and agent iA has the same belief about the world as agent iB, in other words, for
every j, Pr(rˆjA = rˆ∣σiA ,QA, sA) = Pr(rˆjB = rˆ∣σiB ,QB , sB) ∀rˆ ∈ R.
Now we will prove two properties of indistinguishable scenarios which are the main tools in the
proof for our impossibility result.
Observation 8.12. If (QA, sA) ≈ (QB , sB), then (i) for any mechanism M, sA is a (strict) equi-
librium for the prior profile QA iff sB is a (strict) equilibrium for the prior profile QB. (ii) ∀i,
νMiA (n,Σ,A) = νMiB (n,Σ,B)
At a high level, (1) is true since any reported profile distribution that agent iA can deviate to,
agent iB can deviate to the same reported profile distribution as well and obtain the same expected
payment as agent iA.
Formally, we will prove the ⇒ direction in (1) by contradiction. The proof of the other direction
will be similar. Consider the coupling for σA, σB mentioned in the definition of indistinguishable
scenarios. For the sake of contradiction, assume there exists i and σiB such that rˆ
′ ≠ siB(σiB ,QiA)
is a best response for agent iB . Since agent iA has the same belief about the world as agent iB and
siA(σiA ,QiA) = siB(σiB ,QiB), rˆ′ ≠ siA(σiA ,QiA) is a best response to agent iA as well, which is a
contradiction to the fact that sA is a strictly equilibrium for prior QiA .
To gain intuition about (2), consider the coupling again. For any i, agent iA reports the same
thing and has the same belief for the world as agent iB , which implies the expected payoff of agent
iA is the same as agent iB . (2) follows.
Now we are ready to prove our impossibility result:
of Proposition 8.8. We prove part (1) and part (2) separately.
Proof of Part (1) Let A ∶= (Q, s),B ∶= (pi−1(Q),pi(s)). We will show that for any strategy
profile s and any prior Q, A ≈ B. Based on our above observations, part (1) immediately follows
from that fact.
To prove (Q, s) ≈ (pi−1Q,pi(s)), for every i, we can couple (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) with(π−1
1
(σ1), π−12 (σ2), .., π−1n (σn)) where (σ1, σ2, ..., σn) is drawn from Qi. It is a legal coupling since
pi
−1(Qi)(π−11 (σ1), π−12 (σ2), .., π−1n (σn)) = Qi(σ1, σ2, ..., σn)
according to the definition of pi−1(Q).
30
Now we show this coupling satisfies the condition in Definition 8.11. First note that
pi(si)(pi−1(σi),pi−1(Q)) = si(σi,Q). Now we begin to calculate Pr(rˆjB = rˆ∣σiB ,QB , sB)
Pr(rˆjB = rˆ∣σiB ,QB , sB) =Pr(rˆjB = rˆ∣π−1i (σiA),pi−1(QjA),pi(sA)) (3)
=∑
σ′
pi
−1(QiA)(σ′∣π−1i (σiA))Pr(pi(sjA)(σ′,pi−1(QjA)) = rˆ) (4)
=∑
σ′
pi
−1(QiA)(σ′∣π−1i (σiA))Pr(sjA(pi(σ′),pipi−1(QjA)) = rˆ) (5)
=∑
σ′
QiA(πj(σ′)∣σiA)Pr(sjA(pi(σ′),QjA) = rˆ) (6)
=∑
σ′′
QiA(σ′′∣σiA)Pr(sjA(σ′′,QiA) = rˆ) (7)
=Pr(rˆjA = rˆ∣σiA ,QA, sA) (8)
From (3) to (4): To calculate the probability that agent jB has reported rˆ, we should sum over
all possible private signals agent jB has received and calculate the probability agent jB reported rˆ
conditioning on he received private signal σ′, which is determined by agent jB ’s strategy pi(sjA).
By abusing notation a little bit, we can write pi(sjA)(σ′,pi−1QjA) as a random variable (it is
actually a distribution) with Pr(pi(sjA)(σ′,pi−1Q) = rˆ) = pi(sjA)(σ′,pi−1Q)(rˆ). According to above
explanation, (4) follows.
(5) follows from the definition of permuted strategy.
(6) follows from the definition of permuted prior.
By replacing πj(σ′) by σ′′, (7) follows.
We finished the proof A ≈ B, as previously argued, result (1) follows.
Proof for Part (2) We will prove the second part by contradiction:
Fix permutation strategy profile pi. First notice that there exists a positive integer Od such that
pi
Od = I where I is the identity and agents play I means they tell the truth.
Given any strategy profile s, for the sake of contradiction, we assume that there exists a mecha-
nism M with unknown prior profile such that νMiA (n,Σ,Q, s) > νMiA (n,Σ,Q,pi(s)) for any prior Q.
For positive integer k ∈ {0,1, ...,Od}, we construct three scenarios:
Ak ∶= (pik(Q), s), Ak+1 ∶= (pik+1(Q), s), Bk ∶= (pik(Q), pi(s))
and show for any k,
(I)νMiA (n,Σ,Ak) > νMiA (n,Σ,Bk),
(II) νMiA (n,Σ,Ak+1) = νMiA (n,Σ,Bk).
Combining (I), (II) and the fact A0 = AOd , we have
νMiA (n,Σ,A0) > νMiA (n,Σ,A1) > ...νMiA (n,Σ,AOd) = νMiA (n,Σ,A0)
which is a contradiction.
Now it is only left to show (I) and (II). Based on our assumption
νMiA (n,Σ,Q, s) > νMiA (n,Σ,Q,pi(s))
for any prior Q, we have (I). By the same proof we have in part (1), we have Ak+1 ≈ Bk, which
implies (II) according to our above observations.
When the mechanism knows the prior is symmetric, the above proof is still valid if we replace
the permutation list pi by symmetric permutation list (π,π, ..., π).
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A Independent Work Analysis
The analysis in Section 6.2 is not restricted to Dasgupta and Ghosh [7]. Replacing the Rki,j defined
in Md by the R
k
i,j defined in the non-binary extension of Md in the independent work of Shnayder
et al. [28] will not change the analysis. Thus, Shnayder et al. [28] is also a special case of f -mutual
information mechanism—MMItvd in the non-binary settings.
The Correlated Agreement (CA) Mechanism [28] With Assumption 6.5, the non-binary
extension of Md—the CA mechanism—can be reinterpreted as Md by defining
Rki,j ∶= 1(σˆki = σˆkj ) − 1(σˆℓAi = σˆℓBj )
where ℓA is picked from subset A uniformly at random and ℓB is picked from subset B uniformly
at random.
With this new definition of Rki,j, Claim 6.7 is still valid since the proof of Claim 6.7 that uses
the definition of Rki,j—
∑
σ
(Pr[Ψi = σ,Ψj = σ] −Pr[Ψi = σ]Pr[Ψj = σ])
= E[Rki,j] (Definition of Rki,j in Md)
—is still valid for this new definition of Rki,j. Therefore, Theorem 6.6 is still valid when we replace
Md by the CA mechanism which means we can also use our information theoretic framework to
analyze Shnayder et al. [28].
B Proof of the Truthfulness of BTS
Proof of Theorem 7.8 (i) [22]. When everyone else tells the truth, for every i, agent i will report
truthful pi to maximize her expected prediction score based on the properties of log scoring rule.
Thus, pˆi = pi for every i.
For the expected information score, we want to calculate the optimal σ agent i should report to
maximize her expected information score when everyone else tells the truth, given that she receives
Ψi = σi).
argmax
σ
EΨj ,W ∣Ψi=σi log(Pr[Ψi = σ∣W ]Pr[Ψi = σ∣Ψj])
= argmax
σ
EΨj ,W ∣Ψi=σi log(Pr[Ψi = σ∣W,Ψj]Pr[Ψi = σ∣Ψj] ) (Conditional independence)
= argmax
σ
EΨj ,W ∣Ψi=σi log( Pr[Ψi = σ,W ∣Ψj]Pr[Ψi = σ∣Ψj]Pr[W ∣Ψj])
= argmax
σ
EΨj ,W ∣Ψi=σi log(Pr[W ∣Ψi = σ,Ψj]Pr[W ∣Ψj] )
= argmax
σ
EΨjL(Pr[W ∣Ψi = σi,Ψj],Pr[W ∣Ψi = σ,Ψj])
(we can add log Pr[W ∣Ψj] which is independent of σ)
= σi (argmaxqL(p,q) = p)
34
Therefore, in BTS, for every i, agent i’s best response is (σi,pi) when everyone else tells the
truth. BTS is truthful.
C Proof of Information Monotonicity of f -divergence
Fact 2.6 (Information Monotonicity ([2, 18, 3])). For any strictly convex function f , f -divergence
Df(p,q) satisfies information monotonicity so that for any transition matrix θ ∈R∣Σ∣×∣Σ∣, Df(p,q) ≥
Df(θTp, θTq).
Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ,σ′, σ′′ such that p(σ
′′)
p(σ′) ≠
q(σ′′)
q(σ′) and
θσ′,σp(σ′) > 0, θσ′′,σp(σ′′) > 0.
If the strictness condition does not satisfied, we can see θTp and θTq are p and q’s sufficient
statistic which means the transition θ does not lose any information, thus, the equality holds.
Proof. The proof follows from algebraic manipulation and one application of convexity.
Df(θTp, θTq) =∑
σ
(θTp)(σ)f ((θTq)(σ)(θTp)(σ)) (9)
=∑
σ
θTσ,⋅pf
⎛
⎝
θTσ,⋅q
θTσ,⋅p
⎞
⎠ (10)
=∑
σ
θTσ,⋅pf ( 1θTσ,⋅p∑σ′ θ
T
σ,σ′p(σ′)q(σ
′)
p(σ′)) (11)
≤∑
σ
θTσ,⋅p
1
θTσ,⋅p
∑
σ′
θTσ,σ′p(σ′)f (q(σ
′)
p(σ′)) (12)
=∑
σ
p(σ)f (q(σ)
p(σ)) =Df(p,q) (13)
The second equality holds since (θTp)(σ) is dot product of the σth row of θT and p.
The third equality holds since ∑σ′ θTσ,σ′p(σ′)q(σ′)p(σ′) = θTσ,⋅q.
The fourth inequality follows from the convexity of f(⋅).
The last equality holds since ∑σ θTσ,σ′ = 1.
We now examine under what conditions the inequality in Equation 12 is strict. Note that for
any strictly convex function g, if ∀u,λu > 0, g(∑u λuxu) = ∑u λug(xu) if and only if there exists x
such that ∀u,xu = x. By this property, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists σ,σ
′, σ′′
such that
q(σ′)
p(σ′) ≠
q(σ′′)
p(σ′′) and θ
T
σ,σ′p(σ′) > 0, θTσ,σ′′p(σ′′) > 0.
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